

**PLU 6910**  
**Between the EU and Russia:**  
**Transnational 'Soft Power' and Societal Activism**

**CÉRIUM-BEAR Summer School**  
**June 18-23, 2018**

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**B E A R N E T W O R K**

### **Course Description**

The European Union's eastern members and their neighbors represent a zone of contact and of contestation, a meeting point between cultures, communities and social spaces. It is a 'playground' for political and socio-economic transformations in which states and diverse societal groups must navigate between the EU and Russia, between varied economic and political integration projects, and between different values, ideas and visions of society. Power relations in this Eastern zone influence the opening, closing, and transformation of political possibilities for EU integration.

This Summer School, organized by the Jean Monnet [BEAR Network](#) ("Between the EU and Russia: Dimensions of Diversity and Contestation") in collaboration with CÉRIUM, examines two aspects of this larger issue: the EU and Russia as transnational actors in regards to regional integration and "soft power", as well as societal activism in response to these integration projects. This Summer School thus addresses the following broad questions:

- In what respects are the EU and Russia's regional connectivity/integration projects competitive vs. complementary?
- How does the "soft power" of the EU and Russia affect local perceptions of threat or belonging?
- How does real and/or prospective EU integration affect protest dynamics and the likelihood of violence?
- To what extent are the claims and dynamics of social movements in one state in the region affected by those in neighboring states, and with what ramifications for European integration?

## Readings

Readings are mandatory for all students. We expect that students will have read the assigned articles and chapters before the start of the summer school in order for them to be able to actively participate in the discussions. Readings will be made available through our StudiUm site, the Université de Montréal online platform.

## Evaluation

Course requirements for the 3-credit summer school (and for BEAR-sponsored international students) include the following elements:

- Two reading reports (2 x 15%)  
These are analyses of 750 words each on the theme of an am or pm session of the student's choice, based on the required readings. This is not a summary of the texts; it offers a critical reflection on the debates proposed by the texts and is organized around a question and an argument. It should link the texts and compare/contrast their arguments. Reports are due at the *beginning* of the chosen session.
- Research Paper (50%)  
The research paper must be a maximum 4,500 words long (excluding the bibliography) on a topic approved by the instructors. The papers are due by July 15. Excellent papers may (with permission) be featured on the BEAR website.
- Active participation (20%)  
Students are expected to have done the assigned readings before class, to actively participate to the discussions with the presenters.

For the 1.5 credit class, evaluation constitutes of the following:

- Four reading reports (4 x 20%)  
These are analyses of 750 words each on the theme of an am or pm session of the student's choice, based on the required readings. This is not a summary of the texts; it offers a critical reflection on the debates proposed by the texts and is organized around a question and an argument. It should link the texts and compare/contrast their arguments. Reports are due at the *beginning* of the chosen session.
- Active participation (20%)  
Students are expected to have done the assigned readings before class, to actively participate to the discussions with the presenters.

## **Demande de révision**

Tout étudiant a droit, dans les quinze jours ouvrables qui suivent la date de communication des résultats, à la consultation de ses copies d'examens et de travaux, selon la forme d'évaluation utilisée. La communication se fait sans déplacement des documents et devant témoin. L'étudiant peut, dans les cinq jours ouvrables suivant la consultation, demander la révision de cette évaluation en adressant une demande écrite et motivée au doyen de la Faculté dont relève le cours. Si la demande est recevable, le professeur en est immédiatement informé. Ce dernier doit réviser l'évaluation, qui peut être maintenue, diminuée ou majorée. Au plus tard trente jours après avoir reçu la demande, le professeur transmet sa décision écrite et motivée au doyen, qui en informe alors l'étudiant. Si la demande n'est pas recevable, le doyen ou l'autorité compétente en informe l'étudiant par écrit dans les 20 jours ouvrables suivant la réception de la demande de révision

*Every student is entitled, within fifteen working days of the date of communication of the results, to the consultation of its copies of examinations and works, according to the form of evaluation used. The communication is done without moving documents and in front of witness. The student may, within five working days of the consultation, request the revision of this evaluation by sending a written and motivated request to the Dean of the Faculty to which the course is affiliated with. If the request is admissible, the teacher is immediately informed. The latter must revise evaluation, which can be maintained, decreased or increased. Not later than 30 days after received the request, the professor transmits his written and motivated decision to the dean, who then informs the student. If the application is not admissible, the Dean or the competent authority informs the student by written within 20 working days of receipt of the request for review.*

## **La prévention du plagiat**

Le Département porte une attention toute particulière à la lutte contre le plagiat, le copiage ou la fraude lors des examens. Le plagiat consiste à utiliser de façon totale ou partielle, littérale ou déguisée le texte d'autrui en le faisant passer pour sien ou sans indication de référence à l'occasion d'un travail, d'un examen ou d'une activité faisant l'objet d'une évaluation. Cette fraude est lourdement sanctionnée.

Tous les étudiants sont invités à consulter le site web <http://www.integrite.umontreal.ca/> et à prendre connaissance du Règlement disciplinaire sur le plagiat ou la fraude concernant les étudiants. Plagier peut entraîner un échec, la suspension ou le renvoi de l'Université.

*The Department pays particular attention to the fight against plagiarism, copying or fraud during examinations. Plagiarism is the total or partial use, literal or disguised, of another person's text as a reference or a reference in the context of a job, an examination or an activity that leads to subject of an evaluation. This fraud is heavily sanctioned.*

*All students are invited to consult the website <http://www.integrite.umontreal.ca/> and to read the Disciplinary Regulations on Student Plagiarism or Fraud. Plagiarism can lead to failure, suspension or dismissal from the University.*

## Schedule & Readings

Friday, June 15

FOR CREDITED and BEAR STUDENTS ONLY

### 4pm - 6pm: Preparation session

3744 rue Jean-Brillant, room 550-5

Juliet Johnson and Magdalena Dembinska

Presentation of the syllabus and the objectives of the course, to be followed by a small reception.

All the following sessions will be held at 3744 rue Jean-Brillant, room 580-31.

### Monday, June 18

*Regional Integration Project I: NATO, the European Union and its eastern neighbours*

### 9am-12pm: The EU's Eastern Policy and the Limits to Transformative Power

Joan DeBardeleben, Carleton University

In response to Russia's reaction to the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU pursued a two track policy in its eastern neighbourhood - one track involving those countries included in the Eastern Partnership policy and one track involving Russia. This session will explore the nature and effectiveness of the EU's policy in these two arenas. First, we will look at the similarities and differences between the EU's Russia policy and its Eastern Partnership policy, and how these policies might be explained theoretically. Second we will consider some of the challenges and characteristics of the EU's cooperation with specific countries in the region, as well as factors that affect the effectiveness of the EU's 'transformative power' with these partners. Finally, we will explore how formation of the Eurasian Economic Union has affected the EU's approach, and options available to the EU in response. For the second component students will be asked to complete one reading from a list of and be prepared to summarize and comment on that reading.

#### Readings

- Joan DeBardeleben (2010), "Revising the EU's European Neighbourhood Policy: The Eastern Partnership and Russia," in *Russia Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Roger E. Kanet, ed. (Houndsmill, Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 246-265.
- Tom Casier (2018), "EU-Russia Relations in Crisis: The Dynamics of a Breakup", in Tom Casier and Joan DeBardeleben, eds. *EU-Russia Relations in Crisis: Understanding Diverging Perspectives* (Routledge), pp. 13-29.
- Esther Ademmer, Laure Delcour & Kataryna Wolczuk (2016) Beyond geopolitics: exploring the impact of the EU and Russia in the "contested neighborhood", *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 57:1, 1-18

## **1:30-4:30pm: NATO enlargement, 1990-2018**

*Frédéric Mérand, Université de Montréal*

Although relations with the EU have deteriorated since the Ukrainian crisis, NATO enlargement remains the biggest bone of contention between Russia and Western powers. For some commentators NATO has simply agreed to the demands made by new democracies which sought to secure their sovereignty. For others, the West has betrayed a commitment made after German reunification not to enlarge NATO further to the East, thus putting Russia under threat. Before discussing current issues in the NATO-Russia relationship, this presentation will analyze how Western IR scholars have tried to make sense of this academic debate with significant political implications.

### Readings

- Kramer, Mark, 2009, "The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia," *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 32, no. 2: 39-61.
- Mearsheimer John, 2014, "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West Fault," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 93, no. 5: 77-89.
- Neumann, Iver B. and Vincent Pouliot, 2011, "Untimely Russia : Hysteresis in Russian-Western Relations over the Past Millennium," *Security Studies*, vol. 20, no. 1: 105-137.
- Pouliot, Vincent, 2011, "The Year NATO Lost Russia," in Frédéric Mérand, Martial Foucault and Bastien Irondelle, dir., *European Security Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 239-259.

## **Tuesday, June 19**

*Regional Integration Project II: the Eurasian Union and its western neighbours*

## **9am-12pm: Integration projects in Eurasia and the "integration of integrations" idea**

*Yulia Nikitina, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO)*

The Eurasian Economic Union's launch coincided with the crisis in Ukraine and crisis in Russian relations with the West in general, thus, the Western attitudes towards the EAEU are quite skeptical and critical. However, it is not the first attempt to develop economic integration in Eurasia since the fall of the USSR, but the previous attempts remain largely unknown for the general audiences, both in the West and in Eurasia itself. In this session, we will look at different trajectories of integration projects in Eurasia since 1991. In addition, we will explore the idea of "integration of integrations" suggested by the Russian leadership in 2015 to better understand Russian visions of the European economic and security architecture.

### Readings

- Charap, Samuel, Alyssa Demus, and Jeremy Shapiro, eds., *Getting Out from "In-Between": Perspectives on the Regional Order in Post-Soviet Europe and Eurasia*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018, available at: [https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf\\_proceedings/CF382.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF382.html)  
From this volume:

- Chapter Four. Thoughts on Inclusive Economic Integration. Esther Ademmer and Yaroslav Lissovolik.
- Chapter Six. Cooperative Transregionalism and the Problem of the "In Betweens". Yulia Nikitina
- Rilka Dragneva, Kataryna Wolczuk. The Eurasian Economic Union: Deals, Rules and the Exercise of Power. Chatham House, May 2017, available at: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2017-05-02-eurasian-economic-union-dragneva-wolczuk.pdf>

### **1:30-4:30pm: The Eurasian Union and its western neighbours**

*Viacheslav Morozov, University of Tartu*

External factors have always played an important role in the evolution of post-Soviet integration. On the one hand, the Eurasian integration project has over the years become increasingly more assertive in geopolitical terms and is now often presented as a competitor to the European Union. This has obvious repercussions for the relations between the EU and Russia, as well as other countries in the region. The consequences of this rivalry have been particularly significant in the case of the Eastern Neighbourhood countries, whose foreign policy and even domestic politics is now framed as a 'choice' between the EU and EaEU, between Europe and Russia. This has serious consequences for the quality of institutions, the progress of reforms, and democratic representation in those in-between countries, which in turn directly and indirectly affects EU-Russia relations. On the other hand, the Eurasian Economic Union has been explicitly modelled on the EU. It originates in Russia's perpetual desire to achieve recognition in (and by) Europe as an equal and legitimate player, as a European great power. Partly (but only partly) this can be explained by the economic disparities between the West European core and Russian semi-periphery. The economic and normative dependence, combined with the geopolitical ambition, creates an explosive mix that adds fuel to the geopolitical conflict and is to a large extent responsible for the current deadlock.

#### Readings

- Viacheslav Morozov, 'Identity and Hegemony in EU-Russia relations: Making Sense of the Asymmetrical Entanglement'. In: Casier, Tom; DeBardeleben, Joan (eds), *EU-Russia Relations in Crisis: Understanding Diverging Perceptions*, pp. 30–49 (London, New York: Routledge, 2018).
- Sean P. Roberts and Arkady Moshes, 'The Eurasian Economic Union: A Case of Reproductive Integration?', *Post-Soviet Affairs* 32:6 (2017), pp. 542-565.
- Marcin Kaczmarek, 'Two Ways of Influence-Building: The Eurasian Economic Union and the One Belt, One Road Initiative', *Europe-Asia Studies* 69:7 (2017), pp. 1027-1046.

## Wednesday, June 20

*The impact of the EU and the Eurasian projects on domestic politics*

### **9am-12pm: Film screening and discussion**

*Dominique Arel, University of Ottawa*

*ALL THINGS ABLAZE (2014)* by Oleksandr Techynskyi, Aleksey Solodunov, Dmitry Stoykov

#### Readings:

- *Maidan Violence as the Genesis of the Donbas War* (Excerpt of a Draft Paper) by Dominique Arel (U of Ottawa) and Jesse Driscoll (UC San Diego).

### **1:30-4:40pm: Europeanization and Right-wing Populism in Central & Eastern Europe**

*Zsuzsa Csergő, Queen's University, Canada*

Europeanization – conceived as both the physical expansion of the European Union and the larger diffusion of European norms and practices—has had a profound influence on political competition in post-communist Europe. Although the impact on party development has been indirect, in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) the strength of popular support for EU accession created an incentive for mainstream parties to frame political mobilization in pro-European and liberal democratic terms. Nationalism remained a powerful ideology, but right-wing populism did not become a defining feature of electoral campaigns before EU accession. In the post-EU accession period, however, the societies that had been in the forefront of democratic consolidation and Europeanization during the 1990s (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic) became fore-runners of un-democratization in the 2010s. This session will address the questions of why and how a shift from democratic consolidation to un-democratization takes place in CEE. The discussion will focus on the way mainstream parties (and incumbent governments) use nationalist populism successfully to construct and sustain loyal electoral camps. We will discuss the role of nationalism in the process, the usefulness of “populism” as an analytical concept, and lessons from CEE for other parts of Eastern Europe and beyond.

#### Readings

- Csergő, Zsuzsa and James M. Goldgeier. 2004. “Nationalist Strategies and European Integration.” *Perspectives on Politics* 2 (1): 21-37
- Enyedi, Zsolt. 2016. “Paternalist populism and illiberal elitism in Central Europe.” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 21 (1): 9-25.
- Mudde, Cas. 2017. “Politics at the Fringes? Eastern Europe’s Populists, Racists, and Extremists.” Adam Fagan and Petr Kopecký eds., *The Routledge Handbook of East European Politics*, ch.19.

**Thursday, June 21**

*The impact of the EU and the Russian regional powers on civil society and law*

**9am-12pm: The Weaponization of Law and the Death of Democracy**

*Maria Popova, McGill University*

Democracies used to die through military coups or through “an election to end all elections”. Russia's 1990s democracy died a slow death by a thousand cuts inflicted by weaponized court decisions. More recently governments in East Central Europe have also weaponized the law against political opponents. The weaponization of law is the (ab)use of the law to gain a power benefit and improve one’s immediate position in the political competition arena. When used offensively, a weaponized legal act undermines political opponents or competitors. When used defensively, a weaponized legal act deflects attacks by opponents and helps the weaponizer herself or her allies. Weaponized legal acts can also bolster the perpetrator’s position in the competition process by showcasing her strength or facilitating her political grandstanding. How does weaponization of law kill democracy? It can be used to undermine and hollow out democratic institutions (elections, free media, civil society, party competition). It also sows mistrust among political competitors. It reduces the legitimacy of democratic competition in the eyes of the electorate—they come to think that important decisions are taken behind the scenes and communicated through court decisions, rather than arrived at transparently through the democratic process.

Readings:

- Popova, Maria. "Putin-Style “Rule of Law” & the Prospects for Change." *Daedalus* 146, no. 2 (2017): 64-75.
- Scheppele, Kim Lane. "Constitutional Coups and Judicial Review: How Transnational Institutions can Strengthen Peak Courts at Times of Crisis (With Special Reference to Hungary)." *Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs.* 23 (2014): 51.
- Blauburger, Michael, and R. Daniel Kelemen. "Can courts rescue national democracy? Judicial safeguards against democratic backsliding in the EU." *Journal of European Public Policy* 24, no. 3 (2017): 321-336.

**1:30-4:30pm: People After Communism: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty**

*Virginie Lasnier, Université de Montréal*

While nationalist and social movements played an important role during the final days of the USSR, citizens seemed to disengage from political life afterward, contributing to the received wisdom that postcommunist civil societies are essentially weak. Yet, during the first half of the 2000s, powerful mass movements, known as the color revolutions, swept through the region, especially in Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005). After these events, many authors spoke of an awakening of postcommunist civil societies, getting closer to the European model. However, participation in public life remains uncertain in many of these countries. In the meantime, reacting to what was perceived as Western manufactured social movements, the Kremlin created pro-regime movements and governmental organized NGOs (GONGOs), further complicating the discussion on civil society and social movements in the region. Building on Albert Hirschman's famous typology of exit, voice, and loyalty, this session will address the different ways in which citizens in postcommunist countries engage and disengage from political participation, paying particular attention to the color revolutions and their consequences.



### Readings:

- Howard, M. M. (2002). The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society. *Journal of democracy*, 13(1), 157-169.
- Beissinger, M. R. (2007). Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The diffusion of bulldozer/rose/orange/tulip revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(2), 259-276.
- Atwal, M., & Bacon, E. (2012). The Youth Movement Nashi: Contentious Politics, Civil Society, and Party Politics. *East European Politics*, 28(3), 256-266.

### **Friday, June 22**

*Issues of sovereignty between the EU and Russia: de facto states and diasporas*

### **9am-12pm: Russian compatriot policies and the 'diaspora(s)'**

*Ammon Cheskin, University of Glasgow*

In recent years, there has been sustained academic and political scrutiny of externally-located 'kinsfolk': that is, groups of individuals located outside of a nominally national 'kin-state', and over whom the state in question lays claim to various forms of symbolic and/or legal jurisdiction. Typically, kin-state policies are enacted by states to construct diasporic identities that create strong identificational bonds between co-ethnics and their supposedly external homeland. Owing to the scale of its *potentially* diasporic kinspeople, the Russian Federation stands out globally as a significant agent of kin-state nationalism. Indeed, in recent years the Russian authorities have directed substantial resources towards kin-state activities, even codified Russian-speaking 'compatriots' as central elements of the country's assertive foreign policy.

In these sessions we will therefore critically explore trends in how 'Russian speakers', located outside of Russia, respond to Russia's kin-state policies and diasporising practices. To this end, we will examine the issue first from the perspective of the Russian state, mapping the development of compatriot policies and discourses. Secondly, we will try to examine how 'Russian speakers' themselves conceptualise their relationship with Russia: as an external homeland, a foreign entity, or as something in-between.

### Readings:

- (Pages 1-21) Zakem, V., Saunders, P. & Antoun, D. (2015) 'Mobilizing Compatriots: Russia's Strategy, Tactics, and Influence in the Former Soviet Union', November 2015, available at: [https://www.cna.org/CNA\\_files/PDF/DOP-2015-U-011689-1Rev.pdf](https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DOP-2015-U-011689-1Rev.pdf)
- Knott, E. (2017) Quasi-citizenship as a category of practice: analyzing engagement with Russia's Compatriot policy in Crimea, *Citizenship Studies*, 21:1, 116-135.
- Cheskin, A. (2015) Identity and Integration of Russian Speakers in the Baltic States: A Framework for Analysis, *Ethnopolitics* 14:1, 71-90.

## **1:30-4:30pm: Between the EU and Russia: internal dynamics of *de facto* states**

*Magdalena Dembińska, Université de Montréal*

In September 2015, South Ossetia celebrated the 25th anniversary of its "independence" with official guests from its patron-state Russia, kin North Ossetia as well as from Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria and the two *de facto* states in-the-making, Luhansk and Donetsk Peoples' Republics. The ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine has much in common with the early 1990s civil wars in Georgia, Azerbaijan and in Moldova that ended with the *de facto* separation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria, respectively. Since then, these conflicts' resolution is "frozen." Meanwhile, the separatist regions developed all features of statehood but - not being recognized as such *de jure* - they constitute so called "*de facto* states." To survive and gain popular support for their separatist cause, *de facto* states embark on a twofold political project of state- and nation-building. This institutionalization process makes reintegration into the central state unlikely. However, *de facto* state's stability and security is largely possible because of external backing. The literature considers the presence of a patron state as necessary for a *de facto* state to emerge and survive. Still, as the particular case of Transnistria shows, economic and political entrepreneurs have to adjust to an external environment where the West matters more than before.

### Readings

- Lynch Dov (2002), "Separatist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts", *International Affairs*, 78:4, 831-848.
- Caspersen, Nina (2009) "Playing the Recognition Game: External Actors and De Facto States", *The International Spectator*, 44:4, 47-59.
- Kolstø, Pål et Helge Blakkisrud (2011), "From Secessionist Conflict Toward a Functioning State: Processes of State- and Nation-Building in Transnistria", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 27:2, 178-206.
- Magdalena Dembińska and Frédéric Mérand (forthcoming), "The Role of International Brokers in Frozen Conflicts: The Case of Transnistria", *Asia Europe Journal*.

## **Saturday, June 23**

*The EU and EEU in action*

## **9:30am-11:30pm: Kaliningrad: Russia in Europe**

*Anna Barsukova, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University in Kaliningrad*

Kaliningrad region is the smallest region of Russian Federation. However, it plays a considerable role in external policy of the country. This is the westernmost oblast and Russian semi-exclave. All these characteristics give to Kaliningrad a status of exclusive Russian territory in Europe. The reasons of this *exclusivity* are history and geography. The possibilities of this *exclusivity* can be both advantages and disadvantages for the region itself and for Russian - and EU relations. During the session we will consider the different scenarios of contemporary Kaliningrad: the status of the II World War trophy, Kaliningrad as a part of Soviet Union, the isolation of the region in the 1990ies, the idea of Russian Hong Kong, the *sandwich* situation of Kaliningrad in the beginning of 2000ies, the regional and global politics in regard of Kaliningrad: from the place of a military zone till the FIFA host city.

### Readings:

- Sebentsov A.Z and Zotova M.V. (2018), "The Kalininograd Region: Challenges of the Exclave Position and the Ways to Offset Them", *The Baltic Region*, 10:1, 89-106.  
[https://journals.kantiana.ru/eng/baltic\\_region/3755/10344/](https://journals.kantiana.ru/eng/baltic_region/3755/10344/)
- Kosov Yu. and Griбанова G. (2016), "EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region: Challenges and Perspectives of International Cooperation", *The Baltic Region*, 2, 33-44.  
[https://journals.kantiana.ru/eng/baltic\\_region/2486/6633/](https://journals.kantiana.ru/eng/baltic_region/2486/6633/)
- Kortunov Andrey (2018), "I always believed that Russia would benefit from a stronger European Union more than from a weak one", Russian International Affairs Council (Russian think tank), April.  
<http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/comments/i-always-believed-that-russia-would-benefit-from-a-stronger-european-union-more-than-from-a-weak-one/>
- Kireeva Anna (2017), "Regionalism and the Future of Global Governance" (book review), *International Trends (Mezhdunarodnye protsessy)*, 15:3 (50), 95-100  
<http://intertrends.ru/system/Doc/ArticlePdf/1786/fzcQWP4ioa.pdf>

### Latest news:

- TF1. Kaliningrad: un avant-poste russe en Europe. [https://tv-programme.com/journal-de-tf1\\_emission/replay/kaliningrad-un-avant-poste-russe-en-europe\\_5b1c6b3700db6](https://tv-programme.com/journal-de-tf1_emission/replay/kaliningrad-un-avant-poste-russe-en-europe_5b1c6b3700db6)
- Kaliningrad: the Russian exclave with the taste for Europe // The Guardian, 31 mai, 2018: <https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/may/31/kaliningrad-the-russian-enclave-with-a-taste-for-europe>

### **1:00-3:30pm: In-Class Simulation on EU-Russian Relations**

*Juliet Johnson, McGill University*

See documentation on StudiUM.

### **3:30-5pm**

Closing cocktail (CÉRIUM)